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The gradual encroachment of national controls into ocean areas
has been a long and complex process dating back to the Seven-
teenth Century when the Dutch held that the sea could not be sub-
jected to private ownership and the British countered with the
claim that States had a right to protect their interests by restrict-
ing the use of certain areas. Bynkershoek, in 1702, held that per-
manent dominion over offshore areas could be maintained only by
shore-based fortifications. Eight decades later, the Italian jurist
Galiani suggested that a standard measure-the marine league-
be taken as the breadth of the offshore belt over which coastal
States could exercise sovereignty; this, despite the fact that three
nautical miles was well in excess of the range of any cannon at
that time. In 1793, the United States proclaimed a provisional neu-
trality zone three nautical miles in breadth, and the American posi-
tion gradually gained acceptance in Britain. With Britain's mari-
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time supremacy following the victory of Trafalgar the three-mile
principle began to spread to other countries as well.
Students of marine affairs can easily trace the evolving process
of offshore claims: the expansion of territorial sea breadths in the
case of many States to four, six, twelve, or even greater mileages;
the claims to specialized extra-territorial zones, as for example, cus-
toms, fishing, pollution control, and neutrality; the closing off of
bays, gulfs, and inter-island waters as part of the national territory;
and the extension of national rights over continental shelf re-
sources. Unilateral actions have followed one another in steady
procession, and terms such as straight baselines, historic bays, and
archipelagic waters have become recognized (if sometimes ill-de-
fined) parts of the law of the sea lexicon. Now, yet another concept
has emerged, the 200-mile zone. Like the straight baseline and the
continental shelf regimes, it began through unilateral action; like
them, it gradually gained acceptance among various States, and it
appears now destined to become a part of the new regime of the
world ocean. But its impact on the traditional freedoms of the seas
will be far more pronounced than were those of its predecessors;
indeed, one can safely hypothesize only some of the short-term im-
pacts of the new jurisdiction; what the long-range implications will
be is still very much in doubt.
At the Caracas session of the Third Law of the Sea Conference
(LOS III) a great many delegations spoke in favor of the 200-mile
concept, although they differed somewhat on the details of Coastal
State rights within the zone. Statistics vary somewhat on national
positions taken there, 'but a rough approximation is that 102 coun-
tries in the early plenary session favored the 200-mile concept (al-
though with some variations as explained below); eight other States
subsequently spoke in favor of the proposal, bringing the roster of
countries actively supporting the concept to nearly 73 percent of
the total number of independent States of the world. Four countries
during the plenary spoke in opposition to the 200-mile regime, and
four others subsequently joined them in this stance.' Ten other
States at Caracas which spoke during the plenary neither supported
nor opposed the new regime.2 The remaining 23 of the world's 151
independent States neither addressed the issue during the Caracas
plenary, nor in later meetings of the session did they indicate their
position on the 200-mile question.3
1. Opposing the 200-mile concept were Belgium, Bhutan, Italy and
Japan; Mali, Botswana, Swaziland, and Luxembourg later joined this group.
2. These were Afghanistan, Austria, Bahamas, Guinea, Holy See, Israel,
Kuwait, Laos, Netherlands, and Yemen.
3. Andorra, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Gabon, Granada,
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Within the framework of the 200-mile concept there are many
possible variations of coastal State, neighboring States, and interna-
tional community rights. Five categories of 200-mile positions
might be identified.
1. Two-hundred mile territorial sea. Coastal State rights within
the 200-mile area are the same as now exist within narrow terri-
torial seas. Peru, among others, maintains this claim.
2. Modified territorial sea. Freedom of navigation and overflight,
and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines guaranteed to the
international community between 12 and 200 miles offshore. Uru-
guay is a representative country in this group.
3. Two-hundred mile economic resource zone. At the other ex-
treme from the 200-mile territorial sea is the resource zone concept
calling for a maximum territorial sea breadth of 12 miles and
coastal State rights in the 12-200-mile zone limited to the living
and non-living resources of that area. Scientific research by for-
eign States would be permitted in the waters of the 12-200-mile
zone. In this zone pollution-control standards would be set by an
international authority. One variation of this resource regime is
the full utilization concept, under which those living resources
which are not harvested by the fishing fleets of the coastal State
but are less than maximum sustainable yield limits (modified by
economic and environmental considerations) must be made avail-
able to foreign fishermen. The United States is a proponent of the
resource zone formula.
4. The expanded economic zone. Under this concept the coastal
State has sovereign rights not only to the living and non-living re-
sources in the 12-200-mile area but also over foreign scientific re-
search and/or pollution control measures. Canada is a country
which claims these additional rights.
5. Regional economic zone. The living and/or non-living re-
sources of the economic zone beyond territorial limits may be
shared by the coastal State either with neighboring land-locked
States, or with any developing geographically-disadvantaged States
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Malawi, Mal-
dives, Mongolia, Nauru, Niger, Qatar, Republic of China (Taiwan), Rho-
desia, Rwanda, San Marino, and Syria. In some of these cases it is interest-
ing to speculate as to why the governments have taken no position what-
ever on the 200-mile issue.
within the region. Kenya is a coastal State which has recognized
the need for neighboring land-locked countries to share on an equal
basis in the exploitation of the living resources of the economic
zone. Jamaica favors sharing in the exploitation of the living re-
sources of a regional water body by all littoral developing geo-
graphically disadvantaged States.
At the Geneva LOS III session and beyond, new categories of
proposals for the 200-mile zone will probably be advanced. One
variation, already suggested, is the extension of coastal State rights
to the mineral resources of the seabed and subsoil of the continental
margin in areas where this margin extends beyond the outer limits
of the 200-mile economic zone. What the limits might be for na-
tional jurisdiction over sea floor resources more than 200 miles from
shore is a subject discussed later in this paper.
II. OFFSHORE AREAS CLOSED OFF BY THE 200-MILE ZoNE
In the past, most countries of the world have limited their claims
to offshore jurisdiction to twelve miles or less. The consequences
of such claims have been felt primarily in narrow water bodies,
particularly straits, where areas of high seas are restricted, or elim-
inated entirely. Coastal configurations, and the presence of off-
shore islands may affect the location of the outer limits of these
zones since such features may be used as basepoints for determining
the breadth of the zones. For example, an infinitely small island
would generate a territorial sea measuring ZR, where R equals the
breadth of the territorial sea. Thus, a three-mile breadth would
generate an area of territorial waters of approximately 28 square
nautical miles about the island, while a twelve-mile claim would
close off 452 square miles.
The adoption of a 200-mile offshore zone greatly magnifies the
areas affected. A prominent point along the coast could influence
the location of the outer limits of the zone two hundred miles in
either direction parallel to the shoreline. A single island could close
off approximately 125,000 square nautical miles of ocean space.
As a consequence of such extensive jurisdictional claims and of
geographic positioning, the 200-mile zone "encloses" not only a sig-
nificant portion of the global ocean, but also totally encompasses
certain areas, particularly the world's enclosed and semi-enclosed
seas. These arms of the oceans, being important for the economic,
political, and social activities of the bordering States, will all fall
under some form of national jurisdiction. Seas such as the Baltic,
North, Mediterranean, Black, Red, Persian, South China, East
China, Japan, Java, Celebes, Sulu, and Caribbean will be under the
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jurisdiction of their littoral States if a universal 200-mile zone is
established. Moreover, other semi-enclosed water bodies would be
almost completely enclosed by such jurisdictional claims, i.e., the
Gulf of Mexico, Norwegian, Arabian, and Okhotsk Seas and Bay of
Bengal. Even some of the oceans, particularly the Arctic, would
have their non-national areas drastically reduced in scope. The
configuration of the Arctic plus the locations of the Canadian Arctic
Archipelago, Greenland, Svalbard, Franz Josefland, and other Sov-
iet island groups extend national jurisdiction nearly to the Pole
itself. Such zones, based on these islands and the mainland, would
close off a large proportion of the ocean within national limits.
The following Table4 reflects the total areal effects of the 200-
mile claims. The presence of semi-enclosed seas and scattered is-
lands in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans account for the propor-
tionately greater percentage under national jurisdictions in contrast
with the more open Indian Ocean.
Table 1
Allocation of Areas in Square Nautical Miles to Coastal States
Area (and Per Cent of Total) Closed
Ocean Total Area Off by the 200-Mile Limit








The generalized distribution of the "zones" may be seen on the
attached map (Appendix A). 5 The 200-mile zones shown here are
predicated on the theory that all islands, regardless of size, popula-
tion, economic significance, or political status, will generate an
economic zone. It also allocates economic zones, as does Table 1,
4. Adapted from OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE
Am RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Theoretical Areal Allocations of Seabed
to Coastal States. .. , in INTERNATIONAL BoUNDARY STUDY, Lvmrrs IN THE
SEAs No. 46, at 35 (Washington, D.C.).
5. It should be noted that the map is based on a Mercator Projection.
This system grossly exaggerates scale poleward. In fact, the North and
South Poles will be situated at infinity, and cannot be represented on the
map.
to the Antarctic continent. Neither of these Law of the Sea issues,
of course, has been resolved, or even seriously faced by the LOS
III Conference. Pending a solution of the two thorny issues-
islands and the Antarctic-we can only assume, in order not to
prejudice the outcome, that special types of geographic features will
not be deprived of the advantages freely granted to other land
areas. To attempt to isolate these by categories would be difficult,
for each criterion selected tends to contain an inherent inequality
within it. For example, Micronesia comprises a series of small
islands which, due to poor soils and lack of mineral resources, do
not have a viable economic land base. Many of the "islands" of
Micronesia are small, isolated and uninhabited. Should this poor,
developing area be deprived of portions of its economic zone, merely
because it is poor and insular? Such a judgment would appear
to be inequitable, unjust, and fundamentally indefensible. Even-
tually, the LOS I Conference will debate these issues, although
hopefully it will chose not to deprive certain islands of the ad-
vantage of separate economic zones, merely because of their geo-
graphic character.
III. THE ImpACT ON AccEsS TO THE SEA AD ITS REsouRcEs
The allocations to coastal States of their national zones of juris-
diction will clearly relate to (1) the size of the State, in particular,
the length of its coastline; (2) the number and distribution of is-
lands under its sovereignty; (3) its location in the open ocean, in
contrast to an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea; and (4) the nature
of the ultimate boundary delimitation with adjacent or opposite
States.
Until all baselines are delimited and all boundaries agreed upon
by adjacent and/or opposite States, it is impossible to determine
the area of national jurisdiction for each coastal country. However,
assuming an equidistant boundary and a normal baseline, it appears
that the largest economic zones will belong to the following States:0
Table 2
States with the Largest Economic Zones
Area (approximate) in






6. Theoretical Areal Applications, supra note 4, at 13,-35,
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These 15 coastal States would receive among them approximately
42 percent of the world's 200-mile economic zone area. Signifi-
cantly, these States are among the world's largest, or possess a large
number of islands scattered over the oceans.
The median allocation of economic zone for each coastal State
of the world would be approximately 61,900 square nautical miles,
an area roughly equal to the land territory of Romania. Certain
large States, however, as a consequence of their limited coastline,
their coastal configuration, or their situation on a semi-enclosed sea,
will have very meager economic zones. Perhaps the least equitable
land/economic zone relationships will be that of Zaire. The largest
of all African States has virtually no coastline. Hemmed in by An-
gola to the south and its exclave, Cabinda, to the north, Zaire's
coastline is restricted to the mouth and a small area astride the
Congo River. A strict application of the equidistance principle will
probably confine the Zairian economic zone to a small triangle in
the vicinity of 12 nautical miles measured from the natural baseline.
Even if boundaries were developed along the parallels of latitude
marking the seaward termini of the land boundaries with Angola
and Cabinda, Zaire will gain only a narrow band some thirty miles
or so in width. Thus, a land State of nearly one million square
(statute) miles will be allocated only a minimal economic zone.
Sudan, the second largest African State, is situated on the narrow
Red Sea. Its economic zone thus will be restricted to an area deter-
mined by the length of its coastline and the mid-line of the semi-
enclosed sea. A State of approximately 900,000 square (statute)
miles, it will have an economic zone of some 27,000 square miles,
well below the median area for coastal States, most of which are
far smaller in area and length of coastline than Sudan.
Geographic area alone, however, is not the sole measure of the
relative economic value of a national zone of offshore jurisdiction.
It is a well-known fact that living and non-living resources are not
evenly distributed on the land surface of the earth. As deserts exist
on land where few plants or animals of economic value exist, so
too, do the oceans contain regions of little or no fishing life. Ex-
cept for highly migratory or anadramous species, the living re-
sources of the sea tend to be concentrated in the shallow shelf or
bank areas of the world. Moreover, within the range of these shal-
low waters the most fertile grounds for fishing are found in the
middle-latitudes, witness the Canadian, Icelandic, and North Sea
Banks. Other major concentrations of fish occur where upwellings
of currents carrying vital plankton to sustain living aquatic re-
sources exist. This phenomenon accounts for the tremendous vol-
ume of the anchovy fishery off the coast of Peru. Such upwelling
areas, however, tend to migrate over periods of time. The last few
years, for example, have seen a marked decline in the national fish-
eries taken off the coast of Peru. Fortunately, in 1974, the upwell-
ing returned to its "marginal" location and the offshore waters of
Peru have again become fertile.
Just as living resources are unevenly divided throughout the
world, offshore mineral resources also tend to be concentrated in
specific areas. Obviously, until an area is extensively examined ge-
ologically, and until exploratory wells have been drilled, no one
knows the precise pattern of petroleum resource reserves within
national economic zones. Nevertheless, there are certain indicators
which point to particular areas. First of all, a region must have
a potential source of base material for the processes which will lead
to the development of hydrocarbons over geological time. Second,
reservoir rocks to hold the oil and gas, and a trap structure to con-
tain the resources, are essential. Finally, a base of sedimentary
rock at least one kilometer in thickness must be present. Even if
'all of these elements exist it cannot be assumed that petroleum
and other hydrocarbons will occur until drilling operations have
proved their actual existence. For example, the Canadian shelf in
the Newfoundland area contains all of the vital indicators, but
nearly one hundred exploratory drillings have failed to find com-
mercially exploitable deposits.
Other rich, or potentially rich, areas for hydrocarbons are the
Persian Gulf, the North Sea, parts of the Aegean, the South China
and East China Seas, and the Indonesian continental shelf (both in
the west adjacent to the Asian mainland and in the east off West
New Guinea's Irian Barat). Elsewhere in the world, the Gulf of
Mexico, the Canadian Arctic archipelagic waters, areas of Brazil ad-
jacent to the delta of the Amazon, and areas of Venezuela adjacent
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to the delta of the Orinoco are presently considered particularly
promising regions for oil and gas.
Perhaps one of the best indicators of offshore hydrocarbons is
the presence of petroleum on adjacent land areas. Much develop-
ment has taken place, for example, in the Niger delta of Nigeria
and in coastal areas of Gabon. The offshore regions adjacent to
these zones are believed to hold great potential for profit for the
West African States situated between Ghana and Cabinda. Just
as the oil fields of West Texas and Louisiana have their counter-
parts in the offshore Gulf of Mexico, so will these offshore Gulf
of Guinea areas be fields of great promise.
In contrast, other parts of the world lack the vital geologic char-
acter to contain petroleum and/or gas deposits. The economic zones
of most mid-ocean islands situated on volcanic or basaltic bases will
obviously not have hydrocarbons. The same situations will prevail
off the shore of major parts of the continents. One or more of the
basic geological requirements for hydrocarbon development will be
missing.
Other offshore mining activities will be spotty. Placer mining
will occur in the economic zones adjacent to land areas of these
deposits. Sand and gravel, particularly in developing States, will
continue to represent a major mining resource in the economic zone
and adjacent territorial sea. In addition, there are highly mineral-
ized sands containing tin, iron, gold, diamonds, and other sub-
stances, which for some countries may prove to be economically
viable.
Geographically Disadvantaged States
One problem developing from the creation of national zones of
jurisdiction in adjacent seas is that of the thirty land-locked States
of the world which have no coastlines whatever, and hence, no
chance of an economic zone. Other countries have only limited
coastlines, are "shelf-locked," or are otherwise geographically dis-
advantaged. How are such States to share in the development of
the economic zones? Do they have any rights now, and will the
new Convention of LOS III grant them special rights?
Under current international law the land-locked States have cer-
tain limited rights. Although jokes have long been made concern-
ing the "Swiss Navy," land-locked countries do have the rights of
navigation guaranteed to their geographically more fortunate
coastal State neighbors. The land-locked countries have also other
"high-seas" rights, such as fishing, whaling, and scientific research.
But economic activities other than transport in adjacent States' ter-
ritorial seas and contiguous zones are generally forbidden.
Early in the current law of the sea negotiations the concept of
revenue sharing in a "trusteeship zone" of the continental margin
was advanced by the United States. Presumably these revenues
would have been available for both coastal and land-locked States.
Recent negotiations in Caracas, however, showed little enthusiasm
for revenue sharing in any zones close to the shores of a coastal
State.
What then, are the alternatives? The land-locked African States,
meeting at Kampala, Uganda, proposed that land-locked countries
should have the right to share in the resources economic zones of
an adjacent coastal State. While the Declaration of Kampala does
not appear to have been accepted completely by the States of the
Organization for African Unity (OAU), the concept did surface in
several forms at Caracas.
Two particular variations were advanced. One theme would
grant to the land-locked States certain rights to exploit the living
and non-living resources of the economic zone of an adjacent coastal
State. The second concept limited such rights to the living re-
sources of the zone. It is not possible at this stage of the nego-
tiations to estimate the support in favor of each of the options.
It is believed, however, that the latter would generate more follow-
ers.
No specific proposals were made which address the many opera-
tional problems associated with these resource sharing suggestions.
How would the allocations of resources or of derived wealth be
made? One might imagine a fixed percentage of the allowable an-
nual catch to be assigned to fishermen of the land-locked State. An
alternative would involve an areal location within the economic
zone being set aside as a "reserve" for such fishermen. As a third
possibility, the coastal State could permit fishing vessels of certain
classes belonging to the land-locked country to operate annually in
the economic zone. The land-locked State could also be given first
preference within its neighbor's economic zone to exploit the catch
in excess of that capable of being taken by the coastal State fisher-
men, up to the maximum sustainable yield-or to some other equiv-
alent limitation.
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All of these concepts imply fishing vessels of the land-locked
States operating in the economic zone of the coastal country. The
spectre of "free ports" and transit rights for the land-locked State
would then be raised. Would processing plants be permitted extra-
territorially, or would the land-locked country be required to have
its catch processed in the coastal State's plants? It might be more
logical, perhaps, to permit the land-locked State to invest in joint
stock companies, or to form joint ventures with coastal State en-
tities. Time alone will tell how the complexities will be resolved.
It does seem apparent, however, that land-locked countries will not
be granted rights to concession zones for mineral exploitation in
neighboring States' economic zones. Exclusive national jurisdiction
over mineral resources of the adjacent seabed area has become a
strongly ingrained concept which would be difficult to alter.
To a geographer, an intriguing question involves the right of land-
locked States to operate in the economic zones of more than one
adjacent country. Of the thirty land-locked States, two border on
only one coastal country-San Marino (Italy) and Lesotho (South
Africa). One land-locked entity, Leichtenstein, bounds only two
other land-locked States-Austria and Switzerland. Afghanistan,
however, borders the U.S.S.R., China, Pakistan, and Iran. Will Af-
ghanistan eventually have exploitation rights in the economic zones
of all four States?
On the opposite side of the coin, South Africa is bordered by a
number of land-locked countries-Botswana, Swaziland, Rhodesia,
and Lesotho. Will all four turn out to have equal access rights
in South Africa's economic zone?
The problems of other geographically-disadvantaged States are
not generally so complex. Even though Saudi Arabia is shelf-
locked, no one would consider its shelf to be a hardship factor for
the State. Furthermore, it has direct access to the open ocean for
fisheries. Regional arrangements, it would appear, offer the best
alternatives for these disadvantaged States. As with the land-
locked countries, the opportunities for revenue sharing from specific
geographic areas or joint ventures could constitute at least a partial
solution to the perceived problems of geographic inequity. In view
of the inequalities which exist in the geographical distributions of
both living and non-living resources within economic zones of the
world, the issue of reallocations of future wealth from these zones
may prove to be one of the most difficult to resolve following LOS
III.
IV. THE IVPACT ON MARINE BoUINDARY DELIMITATIONS
The LOS III discussions at 'Caracas did not really focus on prob-
lems of boundary delimitation. Underlying the discussions there
appears to be a belief that the existing principles of the 1958 Gen-
eva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the
Continental Shelf Convention, and certain International Court of
Justice cases, as well as existing State practice, will be maintained
pretty much in toto, with perhaps minor modifications.
Generally speaking, the existing Conventions, laws and practices
provide for boundaries in the marine environment to be determined
primarily by negotiations between the States involved. Historic
rights and undefined "special circumstances," should also be con-
sidered. The 1958 Conventions, however, mention only one specific
principle, that of equidistance, which has become virtually a "con-
ventional wisdom."
One may, in fact, look at the existing law from two different
directions:
1) The law is effective and useful as may be witnessed by the
existing offshore boundary agreements; or,
2) The law is too vague to be useful, as indicated by the fact
that most coastal States have not even delimited mutual territorial
sea boundaries, let alone continental shelf limits which are gener-
ally further seaward. If this latter position is true, how may we
use existing delimitation principles for the even greater geographic
distances involved with the 200-mile economic zone?
An examination of current offshore boundary agreements shows
that most of these pertain to narrow, semi-enclosed areas where
valuable petroleum deposits are known to exist-i.e., the North Sea,
the Persian Gulf, and the waters adjacent to Indonesia. Other
agreements have been reached between States such as Italy-Yugo-
slavia, Finland-U.S.S.R., and Japan-Korea. In the Americas, three
territorial sea and continental shelf boundaries have been delimited.
Two U.S.-Mexican boundaries extend to 12 miles from the baseline,
and the Argentina-Uruguay agreement covers their claimed 200-
mile territorial seas. There are vague rumors of a Mexican-Guate-
malan offshore boundary agreement as well as rumors that Chile,
Ecuador and Peru have an agreement which may be said to "de-
limit" their common boundaries in a general way. Elsewhere, no
limits have been agreed upon.
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Does the relative scarcity of offshore boundary agreements
throughout the world reflect a lack of need for precise offshore
limits at this time, or are there serious problems inherent in the
existing rules and regulations? We suggest that the latter is a more
realistic answer, i.e., that the existing parameters for maritime
boundary delimitations are too vague and imprecise. However, it
is realized that it may not be possible at this time to negotiate any
major changes in the existing law. Each negotiating State would
view proposed changes in the light of its own real or perceived prob-
lems with adjacent or opposite States.
Some of the difficulties inherent in offshore delimitations are due
in part to the enshrinement of the equidistance principle and to
the acknowledgement of the presence of special circumstances.
While no catalog has been made of the latter in the creation of
equidistance boundaries, the existence of nearby islands has often
become a major source of controversy. Situated seaward of most
basepoints used for the development of an equidistant boundary,
these islands will be the last determinant points in the boundary
delimitation. The State without islands perceives an island-rich
neighbor as having an unfair advantage in the delimitation process.
Because of certain State practices some general "principles" of
delimitation have developed. A number of these have been exam-
ined in Robert Hodgson's study of islands7 and need not be dis-
cussed in detail here. There are orderly means to assign values
to islands which may be negotiated. The actual practices of certain
States with regard to delimitation are published in The Geo-
grapher's Series, Limits in the Seas.8
It does appear vital that LOS III face, in more specific terms than
it has up to now, the problem of how islands should be used to
eliminate or reduce inequitable divisions of the economic zones of
coastal States. In the absence of more specific principles, the final
Convention could, of course, create a boundary tribunal to assist
in national (as well as internal) delimitations. An alternative pro-
posal would be the use of the International Court for settling
7. R. Hodgson, Islands: Normal and Special Circumstances, in LAw OF
THE SEA: THE EMERGING REGnvm or TBE, OCEANS 137-201 (Proceedings of the
Eighth Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, 1973).
8. OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, BUREAu OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, continuing series.
boundary disputes, coupled with provisions for compulsory arbitra-
tion. Such arrangements, however, could prove to be extremely
difficult to negotiate within the climate of LOS III. But the alter-
natives may be even less desirable. One consequence might be that
of the lack of agreed-on offshore boundaries. For the economic zone
would inhibit, if not prevent, the exploitation of the zonal resources.
A greater evil, of course, would be actual conflict over disputed
offshore territories.
LOS III is also facing another delimitation question-that of arch-
ipelagos. The issue here may be stated as follows: do certain mid-
ocean, insular States have the right to draw baselines about their
islands and to claim the enclosed waters either as internal or as
special archipelagic waters? Interestingly enough, some of these
mid-ocean States would become contiguous to one another as a con-
sequence of a 200-mile economic zone. The archipelago concept ap-
peared in its conception as primarily resource-oriented. But as the
economic zone idea has evolved in the U.N. Seabed Committee and
at LOS III, the archipelagic principle has taken on more of a
security connotation.
The chief difficulty with the principle arises from the profound
influence its application would have on world shipping and the
movement of naval vessels. If the concept of guaranteed transit
through archipelagic waters can be wedded to the political concept
of closing off inter-island waters from the regime of the high seas,
the effects on the extent of the 200-mile economic zone would be
minimal. This statement is premised, however, upon a conservative
and restricted application of the archipelago principle. This prin-
ciple cannot be applied to all island groups under the same sover-
eignty which are located within a single ocean. Only a few such
cases truly qualify as archipelagic States.
V. THE IMWACT ON TRADITIONAL FREEDomS oF THE HIGH SEAS
In the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, four freedoms
were specified as pertaining beyond the limits of the territorial sea.
These were: (1) freedom of navigation; (2) freedom of fishing;
(3) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; and (4) free-
dom of flight over the high seas. In addition, acknowledgement
was made of those other high seas freedoms "which are recognized
by the general principles of international law," a phrase which is
sometimes taken to include freedom of scientific research. In addi-
tion, article 16 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone guarantees against the suspension of the right of
innocent passage of foreign ships through straits which are used
[VOL. 12: 569, 1975] 200-Mile Economic Zone
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
for international navigation between one part of the high seas and
another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign State.
These freedoms have, for the most part, been traditionally a part
of the high seas regime. What would the impact be on these free-
doms if a 200-mile economic zone were established world-wide?
Navigation and Overflight
Most of the economic zone proposals made at Caracas favored
freedom of navigation and overflight beyond territorial limits, al-
though there were some differences. China, for example, suggested
recognition of the right of innocent passage in the economic zone,
rather than freedom of navigation; innocent passage might not also
include the right of overflight. There were also references by coun-
tries such as Brazil to free transit of non-military, as opposed to
military, ships in the economic zone.'
The status of navigation and overflight rights in the zones of the
nine Latin American 200-mile States is somewhat cloudy. Three
years prior to the Caracas session, F.V. Garcia-Amador surveyed
the Latin American 200-mile claims and concluded that three of
these were "claims to a territorial sea stricto sensu, that is, a mari-
time space subject to a legal regime like the one established by the
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone." These were the claims of Brazil, Panama, and Ecuador.
The author noted, however, that the Ecuadorian Decree of 1966
"provides for the establishment of 'different zones of the territorial
sea by executive decree ... (which) shall be subject to the regime
of free maritime navigation or of innocent passage for foreign
ships."' 10 The author also noted that "[w]ithout exception the uni-
lateral claims of the remaining countries recognize free navigation;
those of Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Peru, and Uru-
guay do so expressly, and Nicaragua's claim does so implicitly.
They also recognize tacitly or expressly (the latter in the case of
Argentina and Uruguay) free air navigation or overflight .... 11
This division of Latin American claims was reflected only in part
at Caracas. Brazil favored innocent passage in the belt contiguous
9. Garcia-Amador, Latin America and the Law of the Sea, in THE LAW
OF THE SEA: A NEW GENEVA CONFERENCE 104 (Proceedings of the Sixth An-
nual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, 1971).
10. Id. at 105.
11. Id.
to the coast and free transit in the remainder of the 200-mile zone
exclusively for purposes of navigation, transport, and communica-
tions. Ecuador supported freedom of navigation and overflight in
its 200-mile territorial sea, while Panama suggested only the right
of innocent passage out to the 200-mile limit. Of the other six coun-
tries of the group, five recognized freedom of navigation and over-
flight beyond the immediate coastal belt, but the sixth, Peru, spoke
only of the sovereignty of the coastal State over the 200-mile zone.
The issue of the breadth of the territorial sea (within which only
innocent passage is permitted and overflight is banned except with
coastal State consent) was still an open one at Caracas. At the
time of the session 54 countries were claiming a twelve-mile terri-
torial sea, 41 claimed distances less than twelve miles, 20 claimed
more than twelve miles (of these ten claimed 200 miles), while
the remaining five coastal States reported no specific claims. Some
proposals, such as those of Albania, North Korea, and Guinea-Bis-
sau, recommended that States be free to fix their own territorial
limits up to a 200-mile maximum. However, most of the countries
appeared to favor a "package" arrangement of a twelve-mile maxi-
mum for the territorial sea, coupled with a 188-mile maximum for
the economic zone.
The resolution of the issue relating to passage of submerged sub-
marines through the economic zone is an uncertain one. Does "free-
dom of navigation" also include freedom of submerged passage,
both of military and non-military submersibles? And in those cases
where countries claim extensive territorial limits, would such States
seek to impose special restrictions on the transit of submerged ves-
sels?
12
The general trend at Caracas seemed to be in favor of minimizing
interference with foreign navigation and overflight within the 200-
mile economic zone. The suggestions of such countries as China
and Brazil with respect both to innocent passage and separate treat-
ment for military vessels represented only a minority position.
Laying of Submarine Cables and Pipelines
This type of activity was guaranteed for foreign States within
the economic zone in the proposals at Caracas. One of the few
suggested restrictions was in a working paper of the Chinese, pre-
12. Article 14 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Continguous Zone requires that within foreign territorial sea, submarines
must navigate on the surface and show their flag. Yet, as noted earlier,
few of the 200-mile claims of the Latin Americans are to a territorial sea
stricto sensu.
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pared prior to Caracas, which stated -that "[t] he delineation of the
course for laying cables and pipelines in the sea-bed of the economic
zone is subject to the consent of the coastal State."' 3  Obviously,
the laying of submarine cables and pipelines by one country in
another's economic zone must not interfere unreasonably with the
activities of the coastal State in that zone.
Fishing
Throughout history, one of the basic rationales for extending
coastal State jurisdiction farther and farther out into the sea has
been to expand the exclusive rights of the country over its offshore
fishery resources. The gradual extensions of territorial sea
breadths prior to and following the 1958 Geneva Conference were
made essentially for the purpose of fisheries control; and following
the Conference extra-territorial exclusive fisheries zones were es-
tablished, most of them out to a maximum of twelve miles offshore.
At the time of the Caracas session, at least 20 countries still claimed
less than twelve miles for their territorial sea, but maintained an
exclusive fisheries zone between their outer territorial limits and
twelve miles from shore. Eleven other countries, claiming a
twelve-mile territorial sea breadth, had exclusive fisheries zones
which extended seaward from that limit.
14
The early 200-mile claims were made primarily in the interest
of fisheries control. The Chilean Declaration of June, 1947, pro-
claimed national sovereignty over the seas adjacent to its coasts
"within those limits necessary in order to reserve, protect, preserve
and exploit the natural resources," while Peru, in the same year,
extended its national sovereignty and jurisdiction "to the extent
necessary to reserve, protect, maintain, and utilize natural resources
and wealth."'15 Some years later, Andres Aguilar wrote: "As for
the extension of the rights of the coastal State, the first and most
important is the right such a State would have over the resources
13. See Aguilar, The Patrimonial Sea or Economic Zone Concept, 11
SAN DIEGO L. Rsv. 579, 588 (1974).
14. O c E oF ToE GEOGRAPHER, BuEEAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, National Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction, in LnvIms IN
Tm SEAS No. 26 (2d Rev. 1974).
15. Quoted in Ferrero, The Latin American Position on Legal Aspects of
Maritime Jurisdiction and Oceanic Research, in FREDOm or OcEAMc RE-
SEARCH 97-137 (W. Wooster ed. 1973).
of the zone. This right, is in fact, the distinctive, essential feature
of this new juridical concept.'
0
In addition to extensions of coastal State fisheries zones there
have been efforts by regional fisheries organizations to enact con-
servation regulations in parts of the high seas, and in a few cases
to go beyond this to some form of allocation arrangements. Albert
Koers lists nearly two dozen international fisheries commissions and
councils now existing throughout the world, all of them associated
in one way or another with conservation efforts. 17 Some, such as
the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission and the Inter-Am-
erican Tropical Tuna Commission, are very active in setting regula-
tions beyond territorial and exclusive fisheries zone limits. These
include mesh sizes, closed areas, and closed seasons. The Inter-
national Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries has even
gone so far as to set national quotas for the total amount of fish
to be harvested in an area by individual countries. While such
activities are in a sense abridgements on freedom of fishing on the
high seas, it should be noted, first, that decisions within such
organizations are generally made on the basis of consensus; and,
second, that any country is eligible to join such organizations and
to participate in the fishery.
There can be little doubt that the adoption of a 200-mile economic
zone on a global basis will have a tremendous impact on traditional
fishing activities. Over 90 percent by volume of the world com-
mercial catch is estimated as being taken within 200 miles of land.
Countries with important distant water fleets, such as Japan, the
Soviet Union, Poland, Spain, South Korea, Thailand, Romania, West
Germany, and the United States, will be seriously affected by the
new limits; in the case of Japan, it is estimated that some 45 per-
cent of its total harvest is taken within 200 miles of a foreign coast.
Outside of tuna, whales, and anadramous species such as salmon
(which are for the most part protected by treaty), there is little
of current economic value in the deep oceans. Lantern fish, Ant-
arctic krill, sharks, squids, and dolphin, all found in the ocean are
largely unutilized, and their potential has not been determined.1 8
Within the exclusive economic zone of countries what arrange-
ments will be made for conserving and utilizing the stocks? How
can the coastal States realize the wealth from full fisheries exploit-
16. Aguilar, supra note 13, at 584.
17. A. KoERs, INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS OF MARINE FISHERIES: A
STUDY OF REGIONAL FISHERIES ORGANIZATIONS (1973).
18. See J. GULLAND, THE FISH RESOURCES OF THE OcEAN 205-18 (Rome:
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAO Fisheries
Technical Paper No. 97, 1970).
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ation off their coasts? Will the total world catch decline as foreign
fleets are denied access to their traditional fishing grounds? What
obligations will countries be under to observe international conserv-
ation regulations within their economic zones? The answers lie in
part in the type of regime which ultimately emerges from the LOS
III negotiations.
The United States, in its August, 1974 draft proposal, has sug-
gested a full utilization concept coupled with a priority system for
foreigners. Under this formula, that portion of the total allowable
catch within the economic zone which is not harvested by coastal
State nationals will be allocated first to States which have tradi-
tionally fished the area; second to other States in the region, par-
ticularly land-locked countries and those with limited access to liv-
ing resources off their coasts; and third to other States. But neither
the full utilization concept nor the system of priorities favoring
countries with historic fishing rights won much support at Caracas.
What seems more probable, at least in the immediate years fol-
lowing LOS III, is that within the economic zone coastal States will
for the most part maintain exclusive rights to their offshore fishery
resources, and any non-national fishing will have to be accom-
plished through bilateral or regional negotiations. The coastal
State will lease to foreign countries the right to fish its unutilized
stocks under conditions established and maintained by the coastal
State itself.
In some areas the pioneer conservation efforts of international
fisheries commissions will continue to apply in the economic zones
of member States and eventually the commissions involving recent
entrants into the world fisheries will also begin to gain acceptance.
There will also be efforts toward regional exploitation such
as those in the Caribbean Sea, where nations of neighboring
States may participate in common fisheries beyond territorial
limits. But such procedures, along with the implementation of
land-locked States' rights to share in the harvest of neighboring
countries' economic zones, will probably be many years in evolving.
What will be the impacts? In the short -term, the world fisheries
catch may decline as foreign fishing tapers off in certain offshore
grounds (i.e., off Northwest Africa, southern Argentina, and in the
Gulf of Guinea), and as coastal States are themselves unable to
harvest the full potential. At the same time the distant-water
fleets of several countries will experience considerable economic
hardships as the costs of operations increase, and as they are forced
to concentrate more on hitherto unutilized species. The general
cost of fish to the consumer will probably rise.
But there is also the potential for long term gains. With pro-
tected fisheries coastal States can institute meaningful management
programs. Their own nationals can gradually work into the com-
mercial fisheries industry, and through cooperative arrangements
with foreign countries and companies, the fisheries can be expanded
and improved. In time, regional arrangements may be worked out
whereby geographically disadvantaged countries can share in the
new wealth. Under such pressures the tradition-bound fishing in-
dustries of developed maritime powers will be forced to reorganize
and to more effectively harvest the fisheries resources of their seas.
Eventually the total world catch should again climb to points well
above current production levels. And new countries, with exten-
sive offshore resources, should emerge as major fishing powers.
Among such countries would be Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina,
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Indonesia.
Scientific Research
At the time of the 1958 Geneva Conference, a distinction was
drawn between foreign research beyond territorial limits, which
dealt with the seabed and subsoil, and research in 'the superjacent
waters. Article 5(8) of the Continental Shelf Convention reads:
The consent of the coastal State shall be obtained in respect of any
research concerning the continental shelf and undertaken there.
Nevertheless, the coastal State shall not normally withhold its
consent if the request is submitted by a qualified institution with a
view to purely scientific research ....
So far as the water column and water surface beyond territorial
limits are concerned, the countries interested in conducting scien-
tific research off foreign shores have tended to assume that this ac-
tivity is one of the high seas freedoms subsumed under the phrase
"recognized by the general principles of international law."
Space does not permit a detailed analysis of the difficulties en-
countered in trying to distinguish "pure" or "bona fide" oceano-
graphic research from research intended for economic or military
purposes, nor a discussion of the fears of at least some developing
countries of the adverse consequences of unrestricted foreign re-
search (even of the "pure" variety) off their coasts, and of the pro-
posals by developed maritime States to fulfill obligations to the
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coastal State in exchange for retaining the freedom of research
principle in the waters beyond territorial limits. Many excellent
articles have appeared in recent years on these topics.19 What is
important here is the potential for restricting freedom of scientific
research in the economic zone, and some of the problems attendant
to such a restriction. During the early plenary session at Caracas,
29 countries spoke in favor of coastal State control over scientific
research in their economic zones. Subsequently, 54 other States
indicated similar positions through support of draft articles,
20
bringing the total of opponents to the freedom of research issue
to 83, or 55 percent of the independent States of the world. Coun-
tering this at the Caracas plenary session were twelve States in
favor of the freedom of research concept, a figure which was sub-
sequently expanded to 21.21
If the decision is made to extend the consent requirement for
scientific research to the waters of the economic zone, what will
the effect be on research activities? Is there really a serious threat,
or do the research scientists primarily face the prospects of in-
creased inconvenience in obtaining permission to continue doing
what they have been doing up to now anyway? Commenting on
this theme, Judith Kildow writes:
The changing status of freedom of access for oceanic research is
difficult to document with precision because adequate reliable
records are seldom available. Ironically, oceanography, a field
which prides itself on precision in data collection and scientific
record-keeping, has an unusually poor record of the political and
sociological aspects of its research cruises ... until last year,
when efforts to standardize State Department procedures for pro-
cessing the requests [for research relating to foreign continental
shelves] were begun, many of the reports and discussions of im-
portant difficulties [encountered] were conducted by phone and
19. See, e.g., the articles in Wooster, supra note 15, and Knauss, Develop-
ing the Freedom of Scientific Research Issue of the Law of the Sea Confer-
ence, 1 OcEAN DEv. & INT'L L.J. 93-121 (1973).
20. Data on countries' positions at Caracas subsequent to the plenary ses-
sion from Appendix A of E. Miles, An Interpretation of the Caracas Pro-
ceedings, in LAW oF THE SEA: CARAcAs mo) BEYOND (W.T. Burke ed. in
press).
21. Countries favoring the freedom of scientific research principle in the
economic zone were Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Costa Rica,
Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, East Germany, Hungary, Ice-
land, Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland, South Africa, U.S.S.R., United
Kingdom, United States, Ukranian S.S.R., Uganda, and Upper Volta.
these conversations were rarely recorded or referred to in cor-
respondence.
22
One of the few statistical analyses available was made by Conrad
Cheek of the Naval Research Laboratory.2" On the basis of 339
responses to a questionnaire he found that the distribution of re-
search at sea is estimated to be 50 percent on and above the con-
tinental shelf, 30 percent beyond the continental shelf but landward
of 200 nautical miles, and 20 percent beyond 200 nautical miles from
land.
For most of the 28 report rejections of clearance requests, either
no reason was given or rejection was attributed to diplomatic dif-
ficulties not necessarily related to marine research. The 22 re-
ported abandonments of clearance requests were attributed mainly
to long delays, discouraging statements, or actions encountered
during clearance process.
24
The sampling base Cheek used is admittedly limited in scope, but
it serves to point up both the geographic locale at least of U.S.
oceanic research (80 percent within the proposed economic zone),
and some of the difficulties which up to now have been encountered
in obtaining approval of clearance requests for shelf related re-
search. The author also noted the attitudes of marine scientists
toward the requirements and restrictions coastal States impose as
requisites for the granting of clearances.
The results show that U.S. scientists undertaking open research
would probably not object to a coastal State's desires for partici-
pation and training of its personnel and for ensuring that research
conducted in waters under its jurisdiction conforms to stated in-
tentions. But the more bothersome requirements were those in-
volving jurisdiction over raw data and/or samples, publication
rights, substantial time and/or expense, and substantial modifica-
tion of research plans.
2 5
There seems little doubt that the ocean science community will
be among the user-groups most strongly feeling the impact of the
economic zone regime. The costs of carrying out research off for-
eign coasts will rise considerably. "The operational cost of an
oceanographic research vessel typically exceeds $3,000 per day, so
any coastal State requirement that increases ship time is a serious
financial matter. In some cases, the unattractive alternative to ad-
ditional ship time is to delete other planned projects or oceano-
graphic stations.126 At a time when the needs for oceanographic
22. Nature of the Present Restrictions on Oceanic Research, in Wooster,
supra note 15, at 8-9.
23. Check Law of the Sea: Effects of Varying Coastal State Controls
on Marine Research: A Survey of the U.S. Ocean Science Community, 1
Ocwm Dxv. & IT'L L.J. 209-21 (1973).
24. Id. at 210.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 218-19.
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research are growing, particularly with respect to such activities as
global pollution and weather forecasting, and when the costs of
research even under existing conditions continue to rise, it is ironic
that major new impediments are soon to be placed on the freedom
of action of scientists in those parts of the world ocean which seem
to be most important to the acquisition of oceanographic knowl-
edge.
Transit Through International Straits
The conditions under which foreign vessels may transit (or over-
fly) straits used for international navigation is not a problem di-
rectly related to the economic zone regime except insofar as these
vessels pass through the zone en route to and from the strait.
The problem is more one of the breadth of the territorial sea of
the country or countries bordering the strait. According to one
naval analyst, a universal six-mile territorial limit would result in
52 major international straits coming under the sovereignty of
coastal States, while a twelve-mile limit would affect 116 straits.
27
Assuming there were freedom of navigation, overflight and free
transit of submerged submarines through all economic zones of the
world, the straits problem would not be a relevant one in consider-
ing this regime. Even if restrictions were placed on the passage
of certain types of foreign vessels, access routes might be estab-
lished through the economic zone to and from the straits. But con-
sidering the explosive political nature of the international straits
issue in LOS III negotiations it is difficult to believe that some at-
tempts may not be made by countries opposed to the free transit
through straits concept to becloud the issue by bringing in the issue
of transit through the economic zone to and from the straits.
VI. THE IMPACT ON OTHER USES OF THE SEA
The 1958 Geneva Conventions do not mention the exploitation
of seabed resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction on
the continental margin. Presumably, such exploitations should
be included as one of the freedoms of the high seas, although the
emergence of the "common heritage of mankind" principle has
27. B. Harlow, Freedom of Navigation, in Tim LAW OF THE SEA: OFF-
SHORE BOuNDARS AND ZoNES 188, 193 (Proceedings of the First Annual
Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, 1966).
meant that the development of such resources is planned as coming
under the control'of the international community.
Pollution control is another activity which has become increas-
ingly internationalized-in this case beyond the limits of the terri-
torial sea.
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the
Sea by Oil, which was concluded in 1954 and amended, under the
auspices of IMCO (Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Or-
ganization), in 1962, 1969, and 1971, places steadily increased con-
trols on ship practices in this regard. Under the 1954 and 1962
versions of the Convention, the discharge of oil or oily mixtures
was prohibited within specified zones; the 1969 and 1971 amend-
ments do away with the system of prohibited zones and in prin-
ciple prohibit oil discharge (except under carefully limited condi-
tions) more stringently than those previously applicable.
28
Although it can only recommend, rather than require action by
member States, IMCO has proven to be a strong leader in the
battle against pollution of the world ocean. The question here, as
in the case of other uses, is what effects will the new economic
zone regime have on global pollution control efforts?
A third activity relates to the military uses of the sea. Mention
has already been made of the issue of free passage of military ves-
sels through another country's economic zone. Another element
here is whether or not military vessels passing through a foreign
economic zone enjoy the right of "sovereign immunity" so far as
compliance with the coastal State's pollution control standards are
concerned. Still another is whether or not one State is free to use
another's continental margin for non-resource uses, such as for im-
planting detection devices on the seabed.
Finally, there are the more exotic activities, such as use of the
oceans for energy, for installations on the top of seamounts, or for
the construction of artificial islands on reefs. The economic zone
regime may have an impact on these issues as well.
Seabed mining operations
Much has been written with respect to the seabed, both as to
where to place the outer limits of national jurisdiction over seabed
resources and the need for an international authority to control
seabed resource development in the area beyond those limits. A
200-mile economic zone would include within its limits all present
and currently feasible oil and gas exploitation activities on the con-
tinental shelf. In the few areas where the seaward portions of the
28. Hardy, Offshore Development and Marine Pollution, 1 Ocam DEv.
& IN'L L.J. 239, 244 (1973).
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shelf are more than 200 miles from land depths are sufficient to
discourage much exploitation under current technological condi-
tions.
29
It is with respect to the manganese nodules of the seabed that
the principal problem arises from the economic zone concept.
A 200-mile limit might bring under national jurisdiction large
areas of the ocean floor covered with high grade manganese nod-
ules, particularly in the central Pacific area. In that case, nodule
mining could commence with national jurisdiction, independently
of the establishment of an international regime for deep seabed
resources.... Nodules are found on all oceans and even on some
inland lakes, but it is in the Pacific Ocean that nodules with the
highest metallic content of nickel, cobalt, copper and manganese
have been found.3 0
Some of the more economically viable concentrations lie within 200
miles of Pacific islands, raising the problem not only of the extent
of "common heritage" nodule resources of the international area,
but also of the ownership of disputed Pacific islands, such as Clip-
perton, Canton and Enderbury, as well as the status of artificial
islands such as the one proposed in 1972 for the Minerva Reefs south
of Tonga.3 1
But the presence of commercially valuable nodules within 200
miles of land in the central and northern Pacific may be something
of an anomaly. J. Albers and R. Meyer report that on a global
basis, "[k] nown occurrences within 200 nautical miles of coastlines
are rare,"3 2 and they go on to note that "[i]t seems unlikely that
a viable manganese-nodule mining operation will come into being
within the probable jurisdictional limits of a coastal nation."33 As
if echoing the latter two authorities, the U.N. Secretariat, after ex-
tensive investigation, concluded that "[a] bout 17 percent of all the
29. For a discussion of variations in shelf breadths and depths, see Burke,
Consequences for Territorial Sea Claims of Failure to Agree at the Next
Law of the Sea Conference, in THm LAW OF =rn SEA: A NEw GENEVA CON-
FER NcE 37-46 (Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Conference of the Law of
the Sea Institute, 1971).
30. Kanenas, Wide Limits and 'Equitable' Distribution of Seabed Re-
sources, 1 OCEAN DEv. & I'T'l. L.J. 137, 140 (1973).
31. See Auburn, Some Legal Problems of the Commercial Exploitation
of Manganese Nodules in the Pacific, 1 Ocmx DEV. & Irr'L L.J. 185-201
(1973).
32. Albers & Meyer, New Information on Worldwide Seabed Resources,
2 OcEAN MANAGEmENT 61, 74 (1974).
33. Id.
nodules containing more than 1.2 percent nickel, -but only 10 per-
cent of the nodules containing at least 1.2 percent nickel and 0.8
percent copper,-were found within 200 nautical miles of land.13
4
So there may conceivably be some early action in manganese nodule
exploitation in the Pacific Ocean-some of it within 200 miles of
land-but over the long run, it would seem that such exploitation
will be carried on well away from the coast and thus beyond the
limits of any country's economic zone.
It was noted earlier that recovery of hydrocarbons has occurred,
and in the foreseeable future will continue to take place, within
200 miles of the shore. But some States are already looking into
the more distant future and are suggesting that national control
over the resources of the seabed and subsoil be extended well out
onto the continental margin if the margin extends more than 200
miles offshore. Such has been the position of the Latin American
countries (as opposed to the African block which supports only the
200-mile zone) and such is also the position of the United States.
The U.S. draft articles of August 8, 1974, refer to the continental
shelf as "the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent
to and beyond the territorial sea to the limit of the economic zone
or, beyond that limit, throughout the submerged natural prolonga-
tion of the land territory of the coastal State to the outer limit
of its continental margin . . . ."3 At the Caracas plenary session,
Bangladesh, Canada, India, Ireland, South Korea, Turkey, and the
United Kingdom also supported the principle of extending national
seabed limits to the outer edge of the continental margin, if this
lay beyond the 200-mile economic zone limit.
The extension of national controls over seabed and subsoil re-
sources to the outermost portions of the continental margin (i.e.,
the shelf, slope, and rise) implies that all revenues derived from
hydrocarbon exploitation on the margin would go to the coastal
State, rather than to an international fund. While it may be many
decades before significant exploitation of oil and gas occurs on the
shelf and slope, the closing off of even this long term potential
source of revenue might be seen by some as unjustified nationalism.
Partly in response to such a position, the United States draft arti-
cles propose that a portion of the revenues derived from the ex-
ploitation of non-renewable resources of the seabed, seaward of the
territorial sea or the 200-meter isobath, whichever is farther sea-
ward, be used for international community purposes, particularly
34. Economic Significance, in Terms of Sea-Bed Mineral Resources, of the
Various Limits Proposed for National Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/87
(1973).
35. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.47, art. 22.
[VOL. 12: 569, 1975] 200-Mile Economic Zone
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
for the benefit of developing countries. As noted earlier, this pro-
posal met with virtually no support whatever at Caracas.
Pollution Control
The environmental issue within the economic zone involves pri-
marily the question of who shall establish and enforce pollution con-
trol standards beyond territorial limits, the coastal State, the inter-
national community, or (in the case of enforcement) the flag State?
Not surprisingly, at the Caracas plenary session, most of the maj or
maritime States favored the observance of international pollution
control standards within the economic zone-a stance also sup-
ported by such countries as Argentina, Bahrain, Honduras, Kuwait,
Pakistan, Somalia, and Thailand. Australia and Canada, among
others, favored supplementary regulations imposed when necessary
by the coastal State. However, Belgium warned that it might be
dangerous to allow coastal States to impose additional require-
ments, although these States could see to it that the international
standards were respected off their coasts. Opposing the "interna-
tionalists" were such countries as Bangladesh, France, and Spain
which felt that the coastal State had special rights to pollution con-
trol activities in its economic zone. Barbados felt that pollution
control measures should not impede the industrial growth of de-
veloping countries. The possibility of double standards in the econ-
omic zones of some developing nations is a very real one: one set
of standards for ships of the major maritime powers and another
set for the coastal State and for other developing countries.
Fewer States supported flag state enforcement than were in favor
of uniform international standards. Among the supporters were
the United States, France, Greece, Japan, and the United King-
dom-the latter noting that "genuine link" provisions should be
strengthened. But the trend at present seems in the other direc-
tion. A great many countries are unwilling to continue the regime
of flag state enforcement of pollution standards however they
be established within the economic zone. Given these conditions,
it is likely that there may be serious interference at times with
international navigation, as vessels (particularly potential polluters
such as oil tankers, LNG carriers and ammunition ships) pass
through foreign economic zones. One view might be negative, inas-
much as port States may want the continued use of the vessels
in question. But if the ship or ships are merely transiting one
State's economic zone in order to enter another State's port, uni-
lateral action by the first coastal State might force the vessel to
re-route so that it passes outside the economic zone, thereby in-
creasing the cost of the voyage.
Military Uses
The question of whether the "sovereign immunity" principle for
government owned ships in foreign waters applies to military ves-
sels is a potentially important one in terms of the military's concern
with the economic zone regime. Even if freedom of navigation
were guaranteed for all foreign vessels in the zone, certain restric-
tions might be imposed in the interests of pollution control by the
coastal State. Such restrictions could presumably be applied to oil-
ers, ammunition ships, and nuclear submarines, and to vessels
whose design and construction do not conform to the coastal State's
environmental requirements-a stricture which might prove to be
applicable to certain types of foreign military ships.
With regard to military uses of the seabed within the economic
zone (and beyond the limits of that zone in cases where the seaward
limits of national control on the continental margin are more than
200 miles from shore) an important element is the distinction be-
tween jurisdiction over the seabed as a whole and jurisdiction over
only certain uses of the seabed, particularly uses related to resource
exploitation. The United States draft articles of August, 1974, note
in article 22 that "[tihe coastal State exercises sovereign rights
over the continental shelf for the purpose of exploring and exploit-
ing its natural resources,"' 8 6 while article 28 grants to the coastal
State "the exclusive right to authorize and regulate on the conti-
nental shelf the construction, operation and use of artificial islands
and other installations for the purpose of exploration or exploitation
of natural resources or for other economic purposes . . . . 7 Such
legal distinctions are considered by the military as being important
to its current and future interests.
Other Uses of the Sea
In addition to the eight types of use noted above are those with
more distant potential. At the present time these prospective uses
do not seem to have serious interrelationship problems with the
economic zone concept. Plans for the derivation of energy from
the sea involve ocean areas near the coast for the most part. This
36. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.47.
37. Id. (emphasis added).
[voL. 12: 569, 1975] 200-Mile Economic Zone
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
is true whether one is talking about tidal power, wave power, power
based on thermal differences or the harvesting of ocean currents,
or the use of ocean space as a site for nuclear or fossil fuel plants.
If seamounts are utilized for underwater installations this need
not carry with it any right to a 200-mile economic zone. Artificial
islands are not entitled under the 1958 Geneva Conventions to their
own territorial sea; if this reasoning holds in the future they would
not require an economic zone of their own. Floating cities, ports,
and breakwaters would presumably remain close to land.
VII. ALTERNATIm APRAwGEmNTS FOR THE EcoNozmc ZoNE
FoLLOwING LOS III
It is, of course, risky to predict what the future might hold for
a subject as complex as the law of the sea. The Third Conference
may end in complete agreement, in complete disagreement, in par-
tial agreement, or in agreement merely to continue the negotiation
process for some years to come. The two alternatives suggested
here are either (1) general agreement on the scope of coastal State
competences in the economic zone; or (2) no agreement on the topic.
In both cases it is assumed that some form of economic zone out
to a maximum of 200 nautical miles from the coast will emerge
from the LOS III negotiations.
1. General agreement. Instead of complete coastal State option
as to the nature and extent of competence claimed in the economic
zone, some agreement might include, first, a definition of interna-
tional rights and responsibilities in the zone; and, second, provisions
for mandatory regional arrangements. One of the first topics re-
quiring agreement would be the breadth of the territorial sea.
Hopefully, this would have a maximum of twelve nautical miles
from the shore; those States with greater breadths would then be
under pressure to reduce their claims to the twelve-mile figure, to
redefine their national rights in the "territorial sea" so that beyond
twelve miles they are consistent with the rights of other States,
or else to stand out as "non-conformists" whose extravagant claims
are not recognized by the international community.
Among the other international rights and obligations which
might be secured through agreement are unrestricted freedom of
navigation and overflight in the economic zone, and observance of
international fisheries conservation and environmental protection
standards. On the issues of scientific research by foreign vessels,
and of the establishment and enforcement of pollution control
standards, the best that might be hoped for is some sort of compro-
mise between coastal State and international community interests.
So far as regional arrangements are concerned, one consequence
of agreement might be the creation of "compensatory groups," that
is, regional associations which can provide access to the sea and
its resources for land-locked and other geographically disadvantaged
States. Despite the brave pronouncements of the Organization for
African Unity and other bodies, the sharing of transit and port fa-
cilities, and sharing of at least the living resources of a coastal
State's economic zone with its land-locked neighbor(s) may be a
very difficult objective to implement. States with potentially rich
economic zones, such as the United States, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, and Mexico have no land-locked or otherwise geographi-
cally disadvantaged neighbors to be concerned about. Others, such
as the U.S.S.R., Brazil, Argentina, and Peru have only a few such
neighbors. But for Tanzania, Zaire, Nigeria, and South Africa, the
problem of adjacent land-locked countries is a very serious one. And
if the burden of "compensatory grouping" falls unevenly on the
coastal States of the world, one corollary of agreement may be some
form of assistance to the geographically disadvantaged coastal coun-
tries upon whom demands are made for access to their economic
zone by a number of land-locked neighbors.
2. Non-Agreement. One consequence of non-agreement might
be conditions of "creeping jurisdiction" on the part of many coastal
countries so far as their economic zones are concerned. Either they
might extend their territorial claims to the outer limits of the zone,
or else assert special rights in the zone to the point where it be-
comes virtually indistinguishable from territorial waters. Even
freedom of navigation and overflight might in time be jeopardized.
The recognition of international conservation and environmental
control standards would be up to the individual State to decide,
and any compensations to geographically disadvantaged States
would presumably be on a bilateral basis.
There might also be regional arrangements, particularly in semi-
enclosed seas, but these, initially at least, would be largely exclu-
sionary in nature-excluding non-littoral warships, research and
fishing vessels. Under a system of "closed" seas, as well as "closed"
economic zones, a great many new adjustments would be necessary
with respect to international uses of the world ocean.
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